



Choice and Equity in Teacher Supply

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Introduction

The recruitment and retention of a high quality workforce is a central aspect of the education policy of the Labour Government. It is seen as a prerequisite for the standards agenda, although we do not have evidence which shows the precise link between teacher quality and pupil attainment, not least because such evidence would be very difficult to produce. Nevertheless, the assumption of a link is perhaps universal.

As the table shows, the shortages of teachers which peaked in 2001 have been largely resolved. The number of primary teachers remains close to an all-time high, although we may be seeing the start of a falling roll related reduction. Vacancies are low and primary training is regarded as difficult to get into. Secondary vacancies have not reduced to the same extent, but there has been a marked improvement in the situation in inner London. We may speculate that this improvement is largely due to substantial increases in teacher pay, although other policies such as workforce reform and the behaviour and attendance strategy are intended to contribute. However, this global picture hides a range of variations. The traditional geographical and secondary subject difficulties remain, together with the difficulties experienced by struggling schools in getting and keeping sufficient quality staff.

Teacher vacancies in primary and secondary schools, England, 1990-2004

Year	Secondary		Primary	
	Number	%	Number	%
1990	2778	1.5	3716	2.1
1995	517	0.3	793	0.5
1996	587	0.3	861	0.5
1997	726	0.4	1088	0.6
1998	968	0.6	1391	0.8
1999	939	0.5	1376	0.8
2000	1246	0.7	1420	0.8
2001	2590	1.4	2110	1.2
2002	2450	1.3	1,800	1.0
2003	2050	1.1	1,110	0.6
2004	1660	0.9	790	0.5

Sources: STRB Reports, DfES SFR/09/2004

For a government committed to social justice and opportunity for all, an outstanding policy challenge is the continuing range of attainment and the link between low attainment and social categories, principally social class but also ethnicity. Since the PISA study reminded us that England has a particularly high range, policy has increasingly focused on low achievement. As yet, there is no evidence that the gap has reduced.

In one sense, no immediate solutions are to be expected. As the link between achievement and motivation is crucial, longstanding elements of Britain's cultures stand in the way. Yet in a political sense, the matter is extremely urgent. A number of targets for 2006 are at risk. At key

stage two, results have stalled below the target of 85% to reach level four. At key stage four, the floor target that no school should achieve less than 25% higher GCSEs looks ambitious.

Almost from the start, the present Government has intervened to support schools where underachievement is most marked. At first, it used area schemes – Education Action Zones, Excellence in Cities – but then turned to targeting individual schools, those deemed to be ‘in challenging circumstances’. Now the focus is on ‘vulnerable’ schools – revealingly, those secondary schools at risk of missing the 2006 floor target. Much of the (substantial) additional funding for these schools is for provision outside normal timetabled lessons, such as mentors, or city learning centres, or learning support units. Much of the institutional focus has been on leadership.

There has been little emphasis, however, on one aspect of these schools which is often argued to be of the highest importance. Leaders need a stable and high quality workforce to lead. It is widely assumed that this condition is less likely to be found in vulnerable schools, where it is particularly important. It is worth repeating that the link between workforce quality and pupil performance is an assumption, if a widely shared one, because of the lack of research evidence to confirm it.

Very little is known about the internal market for teachers. Why are they attracted to school X as opposed to school Y? What induces them to stay at or leave X and Y? There are a few published studies which shed some light on these questions, but no official data published or unpublished. The GTC database is too new to reveal teachers’ career paths. Apart from provision within teachers’ national pay scales, there is no policy geared specifically to the recruitment and retention of teachers in vulnerable schools.

The ippr project ‘Choice and Equity in Teacher Supply’ aims to address this gap. This paper introduces the issue, and proposes some questions for further consideration. After comparing the market with other mechanisms for allocating teachers to schools, it suggests why vulnerable schools may have a particular need for a stable workforce, goes on to examine some possible factors affecting their staffing profile, suggests a research strategy for testing these hypotheses and some possible policy directions that should be tested in the research.

The Teacher Market

Previous ippr work has looked at the recruitment and retention of the teacher force as a whole. There is a body of work on the factors inducing people to become teachers, and some work on the factors leading to wastage. However, this paper discusses the processes by which teachers join and leave individual schools.

England and Wales have a particularly free market in teachers by international standards. Unlike the rest of Europe, there is not an inflexible requirement to be a qualified teacher. There is no nationality bar. In these respects, regulations have been relaxed in recent years in response to the crisis in teacher supply in London. In general, the recruitment of teachers by schools in England is by a free market.

There are two significant exceptions. A small number of local education authorities (LEAs) still operate a pool system for the allocation of primary teachers, mainly newly qualified. Applicants are selected by the LEA, which then haggles with its schools which formally are

responsible for hiring. Secondly, in a few places, mainly those schools which find recruitment most difficult, agencies are contracted to provide staff. Fewer schools use agencies in this way than employ them to provide supply teachers on a casual basis.

The standard method of recruitment is by advertisement of the post in the local or national press. Much is known anecdotally about the way the process works differentially according to a number of variables including phase, geography, pupil attainment and social background. It is important to remember that these variables produce a wide range of market situations across England. In some places there is a considerable surplus of teachers and their employers have a market advantage. In others, the reverse is true. Although one attraction of teaching as an occupation is its portability, geographical mobility works in complex ways, particularly in view of the 'second earner' family status of many teachers. All unemployed teachers are aware that they could get a job in London, but most choose not to.

Schools have some ability to offer recruitment incentives. In particular, national pay scales offer quite sufficient flexibility, the school's budget being the limiting factor. Which non-pay conditions could support recruitment needs further investigation.

Within Europe, a free market is not the only common system of allocation of teachers to schools; the others are competitive examination and the candidate list. Eight countries, including France, Spain, Portugal and Italy, hold exams, typically open to those awarded a teaching qualification, and the organisers allocate posts, often in conjunction with the schools' administration and more or less strictly regulated. In four countries, Germany, Austria, Cyprus and parts of Belgium, administrators at national or local level hold a list of qualified applicants, and a vacancy is offered to the top ranked applicant. The ranking typically depends mainly on date of application, but points may be awarded on criteria such as further qualifications, completion of national service, or family circumstances. Refusal of a post may send an applicant to the bottom of the list. Often, the method of recruitment derives from the status of teachers as civil servants.

Most EU countries have more stringent eligibility criteria than the UK. Almost all require EU citizenship, with language tests for non-nationals. Most share the UK requirements in respect of health and criminal records.

In many cases, the recruitment system reflects the market position of teachers. For example, where they are civil servants, they have very high security of tenure, and comparatively high status. Despite the widespread difficulties produced by a workforce demographic structure which will soon require high levels of replacement, teaching is more sought-after in such states than in Britain.

Teacher recruitment in Britain is now as healthy as for a long time. It is beyond the scope of this project to analyse the effects of recruitment cash incentives, other recruitment schemes, or the graduate labour market on this trend. However, it is not immediately clear that teaching is now so attractive that potential applicants would accept a strongly directive allocation system. Nevertheless, the application of some controls on open competition should be considered if they could make an impact on differential staffing difficulties.

The staffing needs of vulnerable schools

All schools need a suitably qualified and stable workforce. Both of these characteristics are relative. This paper does not use the concept of 'good teacher', because it is too simplistic. If we exclude the tiny percentage of teachers who would be incompetent in any setting, all teachers have strengths and weaknesses. Ofsted implicitly recognises that by making judgements not of teachers, but of teaching. Individual teachers may be better with one age group than another, with one ability group than another, in one subject than another. Their strength may be in planning a scheme of work or in improvisation, in subject enthusiasm or in classroom management, in pushing the enthusiastic or in pulling the unwilling. Suitability will depend on the pupil profile; one secondary school will particularly need staff with a strong subject knowledge, another will have a greater need for staff with strong class management skills and empathy with pupils. One school might need different mixes of staff at different stages in its development.

Schools need staff stability because they provide for their users long term, typically five to eight years. Outcomes are highly dependent on the relationships between staff and users. If schools are to change in ways currently being debated, with staff undertaking proportionately more support and guidance roles, this will become even more true; since non-teacher staff are often locally based, as their numbers increase they may well become the predominant stabilising force. Relationships which increase pupils' motivation and ability to learn develop gradually and are damaged by frequent changes of personnel. Ofsted has calculated that an annual staff turnover in excess of 12% creates institutional difficulties. Staff turnover rates which are too high create problems of maintaining corporate identity and consistent systems, but a school with too many staff who have been in post for decades is unduly resistant to change.

This paper uses the DfES definition of vulnerable school. It is one which is in danger of missing the floor target that in 2004 no fewer than 20% of pupils will attain five or more GCSEs at grades A* - C, on the way to the 2006 target of 25%. There are 114 schools which missed the 20% target in 2003. Alternative categories are the 228 schools which were below the 25% target in 2003, or the 494 schools previously defined as being in challenging circumstances which achieved less than 30% in 2002. The smallest of these, and presumably the most challenging, has been selected as likely to reveal staffing issues most starkly.

Hence this paper also concentrates on the staffing of secondary schools. Primary schools suffer from the same staffing difficulties as secondary schools, but to a lesser extent. Subject specialism is not an issue, and smaller organisations find it less difficult to support new staff and maintain an ethos in unstable conditions than larger ones. Secondary schools are also a greater policy concern for the Government.

Vulnerable schools need a suitably qualified and stable workforce more than others. They would benefit from staff with all of the strengths and no weaknesses. In reality, if there is a choice they need teachers with resilience and with exceptional classroom management and interpersonal skills.

In comparison with pupils nationally, those at vulnerable schools are more likely to have insecure backgrounds and react badly to personnel changes. They are more likely to reject institutional discipline and to respond only on a personal basis. They are more likely to experience significant barriers to learning and need staff who know and understand them. In vulnerable schools, systems are under strain. Staff need to be familiar with the systems and the

people and to be able to operate systems consistently. Research suggests that they need both to work harder, and to be more committed, than staff in schools generally, and that this additional effort needs to be sustained permanently lest school improvements be lost. This factor needs to be taken into consideration when retention incentives are being considered.

There are other arguments about staffing levels. It is generally accepted that vulnerable schools need a lower staff/pupil ratio, and indeed various funding streams enable this. However, these arguments are beyond the scope of this paper.

It is generally assumed that vulnerable schools are less likely than others to have a suitably qualified and stable workforce, but there is no evidence on this other than Ofsted's inspection analysis, although in London there is a relationship between a school's GCSE score and the numbers of applications for vacancies. Research should seek confirmation of this hypothesis. It would also need to seek the relationship between this factor and the better established link between staffing difficulties and geography, in particular the London area. It is worth noting that London is slightly underrepresented in terms of vulnerable schools, another counter to the myth of the poor quality of London's schools.

There are two separate factors in workforce stability, recruitment and retention. Since both are determined by the market, it is necessary to consider those characteristics in each case which may act as market incentives not as between teaching and other occupations, but between vulnerable and more advantaged schools.

Where to teach?

Little is known about the factors actually considered by teachers when choosing schools. However, it is known that vocation is a strong factor influencing entry to the profession. In some cases, that may be expressed as a general desire to work with children and influence their development. In others, perhaps a minority, the vocation is directed more precisely at supporting the disadvantaged. It is important to identify ways in which this vocation can be converted into the maximum number of applications for posts in vulnerable schools.

The following possibilities need further research.

Pay

Research into recruitment into the profession suggests that pay is not a significant motivator. Traditionally, many potential or trainee teachers were unaware of the pay levels. There is some evidence that teachers of physics and maths in particular may be more pay-aware than other teachers.

However, during the teacher supply 'crisis' around the turn of the century there was significant pay drift as the market price was forced up in locations, particularly London, where recruitment was most difficult. Schools used the provisions of the School Teachers' Pay and Conditions Document by offering recruitment and retention points or dubiously defined management points, often on a very selective basis. Word spread around ITT institutions and applicants began to negotiate pay levels at interview. Simultaneously, schools' revenue budgets were increasing substantially, making pay drift affordable.

Vulnerable schools are better funded than their more advantaged neighbours, owing to a number of targeted funding streams. They are likely to be competitive in pay incentive terms. It is not known, however, whether vulnerable schools have been offering higher pay than their neighbours, and if so whether it has had any positive effect on recruitment.

Pay is also used as a retention incentive on occasion, in the form of a pay increase offered to an individual who is thinking of leaving, but it is not known how widespread this is, or whether it is used differentially in vulnerable schools. In areas of the country with less buoyant graduate labour markets, the real or perceived lack of alternative employment at the pay levels enjoyed by teachers may inhibit exit from teaching, and the recent substantial increase in earnings for more experienced teachers is likely to enhance this factor. On the other hand, there is evidence that in London those who want to leave the job are prepared to take pay cuts to do so.

Research is needed on possible behaviour changes produced by the recent pay increases. To illustrate how substantial they are, an experienced teacher earned £23,193 in April 1999 (excluding any additional allowances). The corresponding figure for September 2004 will be £31,602 (in inner London, £36,774), a 36% increase, with management allowances of £1,638 or £3,312 commonly on top. Their magnitude constitutes a significant change in the market position of teachers, and we need to know more about their effects on recruitment and retention globally and movement internally.

Conditions

Schools vary in the day to day conditions of service for teachers. Teaching load, in terms of the number of hours of instruction and the numbers of pupils in classes, differs from school to school. Support from other kinds of staff, for both administration and pupil contact, also varies in extent and effectiveness. Schools vary in the quality of career development they offer staff. The use of performance management to support skill and knowledge progression is by no means ubiquitous, despite being a requirement, and opportunities for Continuing Professional Development vary widely; it can be a real retention incentive where staff feel they have some control. There is not evidence that these conditions factors are important determinants of teacher choice of school, but the recent formal linkage between performance management and pay progression may be encouraging change.

On the other hand, there is evidence that poor management ranks highly as a motive for teachers to change schools. The quality of personnel management in schools continues to be a concern. In primary schools particularly, local networks identify headteachers who are to be avoided, as do staff turnover figures. It would be useful to discover whether there is any relationship between vulnerable schools and poor personnel practice.

Pupil Behaviour

There is also evidence that the known or presumed quality of pupil behaviour is a very important factor for teachers in choosing schools, or choosing to leave schools. As well as local networks, applicants will seek evidence in Ofsted reports and perhaps pre-application visits. However, this is unlikely to be a simple issue.

Although firm evidence is difficult or impossible to construct, it seems likely that order is becoming more difficult to maintain in Britain's classrooms. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the phenomenon in detail, but it is associated with long-term social changes such as the decline in deference and the rise of individualism. However, overlaying this overall

tendency are a range of factors which make schools highly differentiated in terms of pupil behaviour.

These factors largely arise from variations in the pupil intake, in terms of both individual and social characteristics. All schools deal with pupils with individual pathologies, and indeed the common-sense explanations of bad behaviour used by teachers are in terms of individual or family circumstances. Incidence of individual pathology varies according to the levels of family disorganisation and breakdown, itself related to deprivation. In addition, social and cultural factors determine the behaviour of the pupil body, or of groups within it, and 'challenging behaviour', where the challenge is against the authority of the school, is also closely related to social deprivation.

However, for any given kind of intake, schools vary in their ability to construct their own cultures of conformity. Much of the school improvement literature concerns how this can be achieved, and ippr is undertaking a study of how schools can minimise their exclusion rates.

There has been a tendency for theorists and inspectors to underestimate the degree of importance of teachers being able to establish and maintain order in their classrooms and the qualitative difference between classes at the opposite ends of the order spectrum. Teachers are under no such illusions. It plays a major role in their job decisions, but possibly in complex ways. For some, perhaps most, applicants, the more orderly the school the more attractive the post, other things being equal. Such posts are less stressful, less tiring, easier from the point of view of achieving good pupil achievement, less likely to be subject to intense external scrutiny. For those who are particularly attracted to teaching by the opportunity to transmit a subject enthusiasm, a more orderly school is more fertile. Other teachers deliberately choose more challenging schools. They often hold political, social or ethical views to back a sense of mission to support the disadvantaged. Some who make that choice find themselves unsuited to the environment and leave for more peaceful territory; others are able to spend entire careers in such schools.

The hypothesis underlying this paper is that teachers choose schools on the basis of a range of factors. As stated earlier, many are not geographically mobile, and this in itself constrains choice. Yet for many, a travel to work area will encompass a wide variety of schools. Of the above factors pupil behaviour may be the strongest determinant of choice.

A research strategy

Much of the preceding analysis is somewhat conjectural. Although Ofsted has suggested that schools serving disadvantaged communities are more likely to employ teachers on supply or temporary contracts, and that this can be linked to underachievement, there is no evidence of differences between them and other schools on a range of staffing data.

As previously stated, no current database records such data at school level. There is data at LEA level, and this could be used to quantify the London effect, the relative staffing difficulties in the capital, but it throws no light on the differences between vulnerable and other schools. A comparison is needed between their experience of factors such as the number and histories of applicants for equivalent posts, the number and kinds of unfilled vacancies, the turnover rate and retention profile, and the staff age and experience profile. A qualitative comparison is also needed between vulnerable and other schools of the attitudes and motivations of applicants for posts, staff who leave, and staff who stay.

In the event that funding is secured, ippr proposes to conduct this research. The intended methodology is as follows. The population of vulnerable schools is the 114 which achieved less than 20% 'good' GCSEs in 2003, and are therefore vulnerable to missing the government's target that no school should achieve less than this in 2004. During the course of the research, the relevant results will become available. These schools are found in deprived areas across the country, in the inner city, on the estates, in seaside towns. Some are in the process of being closed, and should be excluded from the study because of the very particular staffing situations produced by closure.

Each of the vulnerable schools will be paired with a school geographically close, probably but not necessarily within the same LEA, but with a different and more favoured pupil profile. The proximity will place each pair in the same travel to work area and housing and employment markets.

For each school data will be collected on the kinds of staffing factors described above. Consultations will be held with the relevant LEAs, and with headteacher and teacher representatives, on the most efficient and workload light means of extracting the data.

For the second stage of the research, a sample of the pairs of schools will be drawn, by a method which ensures geographical spread. Focus groups will be conducted in which samples of the staffs are asked about their reasons for applying for their current jobs, what keeps them there, and what factors might induce them to leave. They will also be asked about mechanisms which might improve the staffing position of vulnerable schools, including the possibilities described below.

An alternative strategy would be to compare schools which are on the margin of vulnerability with others which were in a similar position but which have improved their pupil outcomes. A third option is to identify schools which share characteristics of vulnerable schools but which have been more successful in staff recruitment and retention and use them as case studies.

Policy development possibilities

Broadly, there are two kinds of mechanisms which could be instituted to meet the aim of improving the staffing of vulnerable schools: market incentives and market regulation.

Incentives

Pay

The use of pay as an incentive has a long but at most inconclusive history. In the 1970s, teachers working at schools in what were defined as Education Priority Areas received a substantial additional allowance. However, the innovation was not seen as successful and the allowance withered. The introduction of recruitment and retention points into the national pay scale in the 1990s was an attempt to facilitate individualised pay incentives, but the facility has been little used. In some London LEAs, the payments were offered universally, a reflection of the strong commitment on the part of teachers, their unions and their managers to collective rather than individualised pay systems. As suggested earlier, most heads wanting to offer pay incentives to individual teachers have used main scale or management points instead.

For economists in particular, the apparent ineffectiveness of pay differentials as an incentive is somewhat counter-intuitive. It is clear that pay is a factor in seeking promotion. The planned research should investigate whether a better designed allowance for staff in vulnerable schools would be effective. One design difficulty is the coverage. Such an incentive might well transfer staffing problems from the schools covered to adjacent schools, which might well be only just outside the qualifying criterion.

If the research reveals that non-pay factors are more important than pay in teachers' career decisions, consideration will be needed of policies to shape appropriate incentives. It is suggested above that pupil behaviour is a major deterrent to working in vulnerable schools. The Government has taken this issue seriously, and devoted considerable resources to support measures such as learning support units. It could be argued that some strands of Excellence in Cities and Excellence Clusters, such as mentoring, are also aimed indirectly at improving classroom behaviour. However, challenging behaviour is likely to be a long-standing feature of all schools, and particularly schools serving the disadvantaged. The research should investigate the potential of provision which ameliorates the difficulties.

Two possible changes would be the radical reduction of class sizes in vulnerable schools and the radical reduction of the contact ratio. The first makes behaviour management less difficult because it reduces the number of interactions occurring in a classroom. The second reduces stress and exhaustion and enables higher quality preparation and follow-up to lessons. The main objection to such incentives is their cost. Other research by ippr and forthcoming work by Save the Children shows a relatively small resource increment for schools with a disadvantaged roll, and certainly insufficient to support large increases in teacher staffing levels. Much of their additional funding is hypothecated, and the additional staff provided may be working outside the classroom. However, it may be that effective incentives to draw teachers to vulnerable schools will be expensive, and it will be for the Government to decide whether they are affordable in the context of its own targets.

Conditions

The research should also establish whether the provision of more effective training and professional development would be effective as incentives to recruitment and retention. There is some evidence that graduates from Initial Teacher Training have a tendency to seek employment close to their training institution. All institutions in urban areas must work with challenging, if not vulnerable, schools. There is some evidence that trainees can benefit from placement there, but on condition that the school has the personnel and capacity to support them appropriately. Does the ITT standards framework permit sufficient attention to the specific issues this raises, and do ITT providers vary in the quality of their preparation of trainees for life in such schools? Is there scope for creating a specialism in ITT?

In-service training in classroom management is now common, although there are quality issues, but the question remains as to whether the staffs of vulnerable schools feel adequately supported in terms of training. They might also be more prepared to stay there if they are offered superior more general professional development opportunities than in competing schools. Opportunities to reflect beyond the day-to-day struggle could improve morale, and in general there are clear benefits to institutions which value further study by staff. This would also be a provision with resource implications.

Lastly, the research should investigate the extent to which poor management continues to act as a retention disincentive. It is clear that the theory of the super-head has been discredited, and the establishment of the National College for School Leadership is a commitment to systematic improvement of the quality of management. Nevertheless, more attention is needed on ways of matching the best suited school leaders to vulnerable schools.

Regulation

As described above, in many states teachers are directed to schools, at least in the initial stage of their careers. There are serious problems in importing such a system. It is likely that teachers would be highly resistant to such an imposition and, given the still precarious state of teacher supply generally in England, it might lead to a damaging reduction in teacher training take-up. It also runs counter to the decentralised culture within English schools, with headteachers (effectively) holding to power to hire and fire. On the other hand, this is a comparatively recent development; prior to the introduction of local management, a decade ago, teachers were contracted to work for an LEA rather than a school, and could be and were (if rarely) redeployed between schools.

Nevertheless, the research should seek to discover the extent to which direction of teachers to posts would result in a reduction in teacher supply. Perhaps NQTs would accept such a provision for a first appointment, particularly in view of the tendency to take a first appointment close to the training institution. Perhaps mid-career teachers would accept direction within their travel to work area if it were a component in some higher qualification, perhaps with pay award attached.

Collaboration

The modern form of collective identity for schools is collaboration, which has been developing very rapidly since being sponsored by the Government. This growth is in itself evidence of a sense of community and mutual responsibility between schools, overlaying the competitive behaviour which has been forced on them. The forms of collaboration between groups of schools varies, but centre around curriculum and facilities sharing. However, there are already moves towards staff sharing. The relevance of this development for staffing vulnerable schools is obvious. If such schools can federate or less formally collaborate with other local schools, preferably including some with more favoured intakes, perhaps staff could be appointed to the group and deployed to the vulnerable school in a variety of ways. An attraction of this arrangement for ambitious teachers is the variety of experience to be gained within a single appointment. For the schools involved, it would enable a large staff to be deployed according to its strengths, and provide significant professional development opportunities.

Conclusion

An underlying assumption to this paper is that the current school admission arrangements will continue to apply, so that some schools continue to experience pupil intakes which lack balance in comparison with local or national profiles. In such conditions, schools with the most disadvantaged intakes will be less attractive workplaces than others, simply because the job is more difficult and exhausting there.

These schools are receiving great attention and support from government because they are central to the policy imperative to reduce the range of achievement across England's schools. It

seems strange that the outstanding requirement of these schools, a suitably qualified and stable staff, has received little attention, but failure to improve their staffing situations will inhibit all the other interventions aimed at raising achievement.

In the current climate of a quasi-market for schools, it is natural that market solutions be sought for the recruitment and retention of pupils. The research ippr wishes to undertake should cast light on the effectiveness or otherwise of a range of incentives, but many of those likely to work could be expensive, and new funding mechanisms would be needed to support them. This would be entirely justified in view of the low level of progression in school funding within the present system.

The research should also seek to discover whether more directive forms of staff allocation would be practicable in England, or whether flexible deployment within a collaborative group of schools could provide a partial solution to a very longstanding problem.

About the Author

Martin Johnson is Research Fellow in Education at the ippr. He had over thirty years experience as a teacher, mainly in inner London, specialising in working with secondary pupils with behaviour difficulties. He is the author of 'Failing School, Failing City', an account of teaching in the most difficult secondary schools. He was also President of the NASUWT in 2000. At ippr he collaborated with Joe Hallgarten on the project 'The Future of the Teaching Profession', and then undertook a study of Schooling in London, and supported the London Development Agency's Business and Education Advisory Group.

Martin has particular interests in the education of the disadvantaged, school admissions, and school funding. He can be contacted at m.johnson@ippr.org

About the Project

'Choice and Equity in Teacher Supply' aims to fill a gap in the evidence about the operation of the teacher market in English secondary schools. It then aims to make proposals for policies which would improve the chances of schools with challenging intakes to recruit and retain suitably qualified staff.

ippr is grateful to Select Education for supporting the initial stage of this project. Further funding is sought to enable the research and policy development. Please direct enquiries to Martin Johnson (020 7470 6155 or m.johnson@ippr.org)

About ippr

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