Press Story

Permanent Secretaries should be appointed by the Prime Minister on fixed-term 4 year contracts, according to a new report from the think tank IPPR, that was commissioned by the Minister for the Cabinet Office the Rt. Hon Francis Maude MP. The report also recommends providing Secretaries of State and Ministers who run their own departments with an extended office of ministerial staff that would be made up of mixture of officials, non-partisan external experts, and political advisers. The report says the Head of the Civil Service should be made a full-time post, and be responsible for line-managing and holding permanent secretaries accountable for their performance. It argues that senior officials responsible for the delivery of major government programmes should be directly accountable to relevant departmental select committees in Parliament in their own right, and not just as spokespeople for their Ministers, and that the civil service should second officials to opposition parties ahead of elections in order to help them with policy development.

The report's findings are based on a study of a number of leading international civil service systems, including countries such as Australia, New Zealand and Canada which share many of the same features of the UK civil service. IPPR argues that the international evidence demonstrates that so long as sufficient safeguards are put in place it is possible to make the civil service more accountable and more responsive to ministers without undermining the fundamental commitment to a merit-based, non-partisan civil service.

IPPR rejects the idea of allowing Ministers to appoint the top ranks of officials, as is the case in the United States. However, it argues that there is scope for further strengthening the role of politicians in the appointment process. It argues that since ministers are held largely accountable for the performance of their departments it is only right that they should have a stronger say in the most important recruitment decision in their departments. It argues that the Prime Minister is best placed to make the most important personnel decisions, upon which the successful delivery of the government's programme depends, and that he or she should appoint from a list drawn up on merit by the Civil Service Commission. The report says that the Prime Minister will want to select the most able and competent candidate, and will be less likely to be swayed by other considerations.

The report recognises the need to give Ministers more direct support so they can perform their roles more, effectively (in comparative terms UK Ministers have relatively little direct support). However, IPPR argues against the introduction of British-style cabinets comprised solely of political appointees. Instead, it recommends the number of staff directly appointed to work for Secretaries of State (and Ministers who run departments) should be significantly increased and that all appointments - officials, non-partisan expert advisers and political advisers -should be made by the Minister. Staff based in a ministerial office could be known as 'Ministerial Staff', irrespective of whether they are officials, political appointees, or expert advisers appointed from outside the civil service.

Nick Pearce, IPPR Director, said:

"Our recommendations represent measured and incremental changes to the way Whitehall currently works. They would strengthen the accountability of senior officials and improve ministerial confidence in the civil service. Crucially they build on - and pose no risk to - the core traditions of the UK civil service. They sit well with current Whitehall practice, and could be easily implemented."

The report makes 6 recommendations for reform:

1) Giving the Prime Minister the power to appoint permanent secretaries without politicising the civil service. The Civil Service Commission would continue to oversee the recruitment process to ensure appointments are based on merit, but the choice of final decision would now be made by the Prime Minister, not the First Commissioner. The Commission would be tasked with drawing up a list of appointable candidates, which the Prime Minister would choose from. The final list of appointable candidates that goes to the Prime Minister should also be endorsed by the relevant Secretary of State.

2) Providing Secretaries of State and Ministers who run their own departments with an extended office of ministerial staff that they personally appoint and who work directly on their behalf in the department. Ministerial staff should comprise a mixture of officials, external experts, and political advisers. IPPR's report does not recommend a cabinet model made up exclusively of political appointees.

3) Strengthening the role of the Head of the Civil Service in respect of holding permanent secretaries accountable. The Head of the Civil Service should be a full-time post, taking on all responsibilities for managing permanent secretaries, providing a similar role to that performed by the New Zealand State Service Commissioner.

4) Introducing fixed-term contracts for new permanent secretaries. These would be for four years and would be renewable depending on performance. The Head of the Civil Service would be responsible for appraising permanent secretaries but the ultimate decision over whether to renew contracts should rest with the Prime Minister.

5) Strengthening the external accountability of senior civil servants in key operational roles. Senior Whitehall officials charged with major programmatic and implementation tasks should be made directly accountable to parliament for their performance, in the same way that Permanent Secretaries appear in their own right as accounting officers).

6) Enabling the civil service to better support Opposition parties by allowing officials to be seconded into opposition parties to help them with policy development.

The Civil Service Commission has recently issued revised guidance on the process of appointment of permanent secretaries. This gives Secretaries of State input into the process at key points, from consultation on the nature of the job specification to meeting short listed candidates. Secretaries of State may also ask for recruitment panels to reconsider their recommendations if she or he is not satisfied they have chosen the best candidate.

IPPR recommends building on these reforms by giving the Prime Minister the final choice of appointable candidates. It suggests the following model of appointment:

o When a permanent secretary vacancy arises the Head of the Civil Service will sit down with the relevant Secretary of State to agree the job description and person specification, and the terms of the advertisement, as now.

o In line with the Civil Service Commission guidelines, the Secretary of the State will then agree with the First Commissioner the composition of the interview panel for the short listed candidates (in particular to ensure that there is sufficient external challenge from outside the Civil Service. Non-Executive Directors can play an important role here). There will then be an opportunity for the Secretary of State to meet each of the short listed candidates, to discuss his or her priorities and the candidate's approach to the role; and feedback to the panel any strengths and weaknesses to probe at final interview.
o Since the Prime Minister will make the final appointment s/he should be kept informed of the different stages of the selection process (s/he may, for instance, want to feed-in into the job description at the outset).
o It is then the responsibility of the panel to assess the merits of the candidates in the final interview. The First Commissioner would then be tasked with making a recommendation of the top candidates to the Prime Minister. In doing so the First Commissioner must set out how each candidate meets the person specification, and record how the Secretary of State's views had been taken into account.
o The final list that goes up to the Prime Minister should be endorsed by the Secretary of State but to this extent alone: he or she can ask the recruitment panel to reconsider its candidate recommendations before they are put to the Prime Minister if he or she is unsatisfied with them, (this would not amount to a formal veto power).
o It would then be for the Prime Minister to select one of the names recommended by the First Commissioner. In making his/her decision the Prime Minister will consult the Secretary of State, (and will want in particular to be confident that the Secretary of State will be able to get on with the candidate he picks), and seek the advice of the Minister for the Cabinet Office, the Head of the Civil Service and the Cabinet Secretary, but it his or her decision to make.
o The Prime Minister - as is now the case - will also have a veto power and can ask for the appointment process to begin again if s/he is not prepared to appoint one of the recommended candidates put forward by the First Commissioner.

Notes to editors

IPPR's report - will be published by the Cabinet Office and will be available to download from: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications?departments%5B%5D=cabinet-office

IPPR to studied the civil service in the following countries: New Zealand, Australia, Singapore, Sweden, France, United States, Canada & the European Union.

IPPR's research was independently conducted. The research was commissioned by the Cabinet Office following a successful competitive bid by IPPR to the Contestability Fund. It is the first research to be commissioned and published in this way by Government.

Contacts

Richard Darlington, 07525 481 602, r.darlington@ippr.org